DISMANTLING THE WALL
Charles Shane Ellison* & Anjum Gupta**
INTRODUCTION
Between 2017 and 2021, the Trump Administration waged an
unprecedented battle on U.S. asylum structure, procedure, and
substantive law. Seeking to alter long-standing legal principles and
practices in a host of areas, the former administration’s efforts to
demolish asylum protections were systematic and comprehensive. The
Immigration Policy Tracking Project cataloged no fewer than ninety-six
discrete policy and regulatory changes that the former administration
implemented to curtail access to asylum. 1 While some of the
administration’s actions, such as the decision to separate children from
their parents at the border, were carried out in the open, many other
actions were largely hidden from public view. In their totality, scholars
have characterized those changes without much hyperbole as the end of
asylum in the U.S.,2 a veritable administrative wall to refugees.
Despite widespread initial optimism upon the election of a new
president and some incremental steps, the Biden Administration has yet
to roll back the majority of these changes, let alone take steps to expand
access to asylum or increase fairness in the system. Within his first month
in office, President Biden promised to undertake a comprehensive review
of the U.S. asylum system and promulgate regulations consistent with our
international legal obligations within 270 days;3 however, that deadline
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1. 97
Policies,
IMMIGR.
POL’Y
TRACKING
PROJECT,
https://immpolicytracking.org/policies/?subject_matter=asylum-withholding-and-cat
[perma.cc/7WLW-D4A2]. The Immigration Policy Tracking Project (IPTP) catalogs the
known immigration policies of the Trump Administration. Each entry contains underlying
source documents, relevant predecessor policies, and the current status of each policy. IPTP
was created by Professor Lucas Guttentag and is maintained by students at Stanford and Yale
law schools supported by a team of immigration experts. See IMMIGR. POL’Y TRACKING PROJECT,
https://immpolicytracking.org/home [perma.cc/C7SG-HTPT].
2. See generally ANDREW I. SCHOENHOLTZ , JAYA RAMJI-NOGALES & PHILIP S. SCHRAG, THE
END OF ASYLUM (2021).
3. See Exec. Order No. 14010, 86 Fed. Reg. 8,267, 8,271 (Feb. 2, 2021).
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has come and gone without any proposed regulations or an explanation
for their absence.4
The contemporary U.S. asylum system was born through the robustly
bipartisan 1980 Refugee Act.5 From that moment to the present, the
nation has not witnessed such unmitigated antipathy towards refugees
and asylum seekers as during the Trump era. The toll paid by these
changes, measured both in human lives and the erosion of our national
values, is staggering. Yet, the fissures revealed by this unparalleled period
of restriction of access to asylum can guide us both in understanding the
extent of the present asylum crises and in knowing how best to move
forward.
Through all its bluster about building a physical wall along the
southern border to keep refugees and other immigrants out, the Trump
Administration succeeded in erecting an administrative wall, preventing
countless bona fide refugees from seeking or obtaining the protection for
which they are eligible. To date, that wall has not been taken down. At
best, the Biden Administration has tinkered with this barrier to refugees,
and at worst, it has deliberately left some sections standing.
In this Essay, we will summarize the status quo of this crisis. We will
highlight warning signs that began to appear even before the Trump
Administration to understand how we reached this point. We will then
propose solutions to chart a pathway forward, exploring strategies for
implementing lasting reforms aimed at tearing down this administrative
wall and replacing it with a more fair and welcoming system.
I.

WHERE DO WE STAND NOW?

After four years of sustained efforts by the Trump Administration to
erode asylum protections in the U.S., the nation is still at a crossroads. A
palpable tension persists between the long-standing humanitarian ethos
that beckons to our shores those “huddled masses yearning to breathe
free”6 and a xenophobic impulse bent on dramatically reducing
immigration. As one Trump Administration official confessed, their
“mantra [had] persistently been presenting aliens with multiple
unsolvable dilemmas to impact their calculus for choosing to make the

4. CTR. FOR GENDER & REFUGEE STUD., DEADLY INERTIA: NEEDLESS DELAY OF “PARTICULAR
SOCIAL GROUP” REGULATIONS PUTS ASYLUM SEEKERS AT RISK 1 (2022),
https://cgrs.uchastings.edu/sites/default/files/Deadly%20Inertia%20%20PSG%20Regs%20Guide_Feb.%202022.pdf [perma.cc/MHQ6-72L5].
5. Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (1980) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 8 U.S.C.)
6. Emma
Lazarus,
The
New
Colossus,
POETRY
FOUND.,
https://www.poetryfoundation.org/poems/46550/the-new-colossus [perma.cc/CQU7R7RU].
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arduous journey to [the U.S.].”7 But, as the Somali refugee and poet
Warsan Shire has poignantly observed, “no one leaves home unless home
is the mouth of a shark.”8 Thus, the Trump Administration’s efforts would
have to be quite cruel to alter the outcome of the archetypal refugee’s
tragic risk calculus.
In pursuit of their goal to create “unsolvable dilemmas” for refugees
and asylum seekers, in 2018, the former administration shocked the
country through its “zero-tolerance” program that intentionally
separated thousands of children from their parents in the hopes of
creating a “deterrent effect.”9 Although the formal policy was rescinded
in the wake of widespread public opprobrium, efforts to erect hurdles for
refugees and asylum seekers persisted, often out of the public eye.
By the final years of the Trump Administration, through a
combination of a lowered cap on refugee admissions and “increased
vetting” processes for refugee admissions, the U.S. reached its lowest ebb
of resettlement numbers in the forty-year history of the Refugee Act,
descending beneath even the years that followed 9/11. 10 Yet, the true
impact of this reduction went beyond just the denial of resettlement
opportunities during one of the worst global refugee crises since WWII.
The dramatic reductions in refugee admission also ensured long-term
damage to the U.S. resettlement apparatus writ large by causing many
refugee resettlement organizations—whose funding streams derive in
part from per capita payments from the U.S. government for each refugee
resettled—to close shop. By the end of the fiscal year 2019, more than
one hundred resettlement offices in the U.S. were shuttered due to
plummeting refugee admissions.11

7. Julia Ainsley, Stephen Miller Wants Border Patrol, Not Asylum Officers, to
Determine Migrant Asylum Claims, NBC NEWS (July 29, 2019, 7:31 PM),
https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/immigration/stephen-miller-wants-use-borderagents-screen-migrants-cut-number-n1035831
[perma.cc/8YEC-8D86]
(emphasis
added).
8. “Home”
by
Warsan
Shire,
FACING
HIST.
&
OURSELVES,
https://www.facinghistory.org/standing-up-hatred-intolerance/warsan-shire-homeh
[perma.cc/WC9E-9BJH].
9. Philip Bump, Here Are the Administration Officials Who Have Said That Family
Separation Is Meant as a Deterrent, WASH. POST (June 19, 2018),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/politics/wp/2018/06/19/here-are-theadministration-officials-who-have-said-that-family-separation-is-meant-as-a-deterrent
[perma.cc/V8MH-E6D6].
10. Kira Monin, Jeanne Batalova & Tianjian Lai, Refugees and Asylees in the United
States,
MIGRATION
POL’Y
INST.
(May
13,
2021),
https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/refugees-and-asylees-united-states-2021
[perma.cc/6QWU-VBPY].
11. Tania Karas, US Refugee Agencies Wither as Trump Administration Cuts
Numbers
to
Historic
Lows,
WORLD
(Sept.
27,
2019,
12:00
PM),
https://www.pri.org/stories/2019-09-27/us-refugee-agencies-wither-trumpadministration-cuts-numbers-historic-lows [perma.cc/N7TJ-HB4N].
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Asylum processing at the border likewise ground to a halt as a result
of iterative and culminating procedural changes. The litany of changes
included: altering the internal guidelines for asylum officers to drive
down positive credible fear findings; creating tortuously long wait times
to seek asylum at the border (resulting in a waitlist that eventually
climbed to 26,000 individuals); enlisting Customs and Border Protection
officials—who had made headlines for coercing asylum seekers to
withdraw their requests for asylum—to conduct asylum screenings; and
creating the “Remain in Mexico” policy (deceptively called Migration
Protection Protocols or MPP) that forced nearly 71,000 people to live in
perilous conditions along the U.S.-Mexico border while waiting for a
hearing, at which virtually no one would have access to counsel and
where nearly all decisions resulted in denial. 12 Layered on top of these
changes were additional grounds for denial for asylum seekers who
sought to avoid this labyrinth of “unsolvable dilemmas” by entering the
U.S. surreptitiously outside of a designated point of entry, or who
transited through another country en route to the U.S. without first
seeking asylum there.13 The coup de grâce of the Trump Administration’s
war on asylum at the border was the imposition of Title 42 expulsions,
which used the COVID-19 pandemic as an opportunity to shut off what
little trickle remained of asylum seekers pursuing protection along the
southern border. 14
The former administration’s ire was not cabined to just border policy,
however; asylum processing within the interior likewise suffered as a
result of significant substantive changes to asylum law. One category of
asylum claims given particular attention during the Trump presidency
involved putative refugees fleeing persecution inflicted by nonstate
persecutors. Threatened by transnational criminal organizations and
terrorist groups to domestic abusers and rebel factions, a significant
number of asylum seekers flee their countries due to persecution
committed at the hands of nongovernmental actors. 15 Indeed, the lion’s
share of asylum claims brought by applicants fleeing Mexico and the

12. See SCHOENHOLTZ ET AL., supra note 2, at 47–67; Adolfo Flores & Hamed Aleaziz,
The Supreme Court Ruled That Biden Must Restart Trump’s “Remain in Mexico” Program,
BUZZFEED
NEWS
(Aug.
25,
2021,
1:49
AM),
https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/adolfoflores/the-supreme-court-ruled-thatbiden-must-restarttrumps?utm_source=dailybrief&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=DailyBrief2021Au
g25&utm_term=DailyNewsBrief [perma.cc/QTX5-P6QE].
13. See SCHOENHOLTZ ET AL., supra note 2, at 47.
14. See id. at 79–86.
15. See generally Charles Shane Ellison & Anjum Gupta, Unwilling or Unable? The
Failure to Conform the Nonstate Actor Standard in Asylum Claims to the Refugee Act, 52
COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 441 (2021) (setting forth a framework for the nonstate actor
standard under the Refugee Act).
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Northern Triangle (i.e., El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras) are
nonstate persecutor claims.16
The former administration characterized these claims as illegitimate
and made significant efforts to greatly limit their probability of success.
Specifically, former Attorney General Jeff Sessions wrote in a 2018
precedent decision that “[g]enerally,” claims based upon harms
“perpetrated by non-governmental actors will not qualify for asylum.”17
This conclusion stemmed in part from the attorney general’s holding that
when a persecutor is a nonstate actor, an applicant for protection must
establish that her government either “condone[s]” her persecution or is
“complete[ly] helpless[]” to protect her from such persecution,18 a
standard vastly more difficult to satisfy than the preexisting one. 19
His conclusion also stemmed from his assessment that “[w]hen
private actors inflict violence based on a personal relationship with a
victim, then the victim’s membership in a large[] group may well not be
‘one central reason’ for the abuse.”20 In other words, Sessions casted
doubt upon whether such victims could prove the required causal link, or
nexus, between the persecution they suffered or fear and a statutorily
protected ground.
Finally, Sessions sought to further delegitimize claims involving
domestic violence in particular by overturning an Obama-era precedent
decision that had recognized that women who were persecuted by their
abusers because of their inability to leave their domestic relationship
were members of a valid “social group” under the Refugee Act.21 In
upending that settled precedent, Sessions argued that a social group so
defined was impermissibly circular, insufficiently particular, and
inadequately distinct in the eyes of the society in question.22
The following year, under Attorney General Barr, the administration
continued the onslaught by overturning another Obama-era precedent
that had recognized that persecution based upon one’s family

16. See UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMM’R FOR REFUGEES, WOMEN ON THE RUN: FIRST-HAND
ACCOUNTS OF REFUGEES FLEEING EL S ALVADOR, GUATEMALA, HONDURAS, AND MEXICO, 15 (2015)
https://www.unhcr.org/56fc31864.html [perma.cc/HP34-2H8U] (stating that women
fled due to violence at the hands of criminal armed groups and due to “brutal domestic
violence”); UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMM’ R FOR REFUGEES, CHILDREN ON THE RUN:
UNACCOMPANIED CHILDREN LEAVING CENTRAL AMERICA AND MEXICO AND THE NEED FOR
INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION , 44–45 (2014) https://www.unhcr.org/56fc266f4.html
[perma.cc/T3JY-ZFS6] (citing gang violence and domestic violence as reasons children
flee).
17. A-B- (Matter of A-B- I), 27 I. & N. Dec. 316, 320 (A.G. 2018) (emphasis added).
18. Id. at 337 (quoting Galina v. Immigr. & Naturalization Serv., 213 F.3d 955, 958
(7th Cir. 2000)).
19. Ellison & Gupta, supra note 15, at 463–66.
20. Matter of A-B- I, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 338.
21. Id. at 346 (overruling A-R-C-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 388 (B.I.A. 2014)).
22. Id. at 334–36.
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membership could qualify one for asylum protection—another blow to a
large category of claims.23 Even in the final days of the Trump
Administration, the acting attorney general continued working to restrict
access to asylum by doubling down on the already heightened nonstate
actor and nexus tests the administration had created in prior decisions.24
The foregoing summary is nonexhaustive, but the enumerated
examples listed here illustrate the extent to which the Trump
Administration could implement distortions to long-standing procedural
and substantive requirements related to asylum eligibility, all without
any assistance from Congress. In their combination, these changes
amounted to an administrative wall of ineligibility, barring from
protection those “huddled masses yearning to breathe free.”
For its part, the Biden Administration has recognized that violence
“perpetrated by criminal gangs, trafficking networks, and other
organized criminal organizations” along with “sexual, gender-based, and
domestic violence” are among some of the root causes of migration from
the Northern Triangle, and can give rise to viable claims for refugee
protection.25 As noted above, President Biden has ordered a
“comprehensive examination of current rules, regulations, precedential
decisions, and internal guidelines” with the goal of evaluating “whether
the United States provides protection for those fleeing domestic or gang
violence . . . consistent with international standards.” 26 And the new
administration has rolled back a small number of the harmful practices
and precedents from the Trump era.27
However, there remains much work to be done. The Biden
Administration continues to wade through the morass of tangled policies,
precedents, and regulations it inherited. It has failed to meet its own
deadline for promulgating regulations that would correct some longstanding deficiencies in asylum law.28 Hundreds of children have yet to

23. L-E-A- (Matter of L-E-A- II), 27 I. & N. Dec. 581, 596 (A.G. 2019) (overruling in
part L-E-A- (Matter of L-E-A- I), 27 I. & N. Dec. 40 (B.I.A. 2017)).
24. A-B- (Matter of A-B- II), 28 I. & N. Dec. 199, 201–02 (A.G. 2021).
25. See Exec. Order No. 14010, 86 Fed. Reg. 8,267, 8,268 (Feb. 2, 2021).
26. Id. at 8,271.
27. Alejandro N. Mayorkas, Termination of the Migrant Protection Protocols
Program,
DEP’T
OF
HOMELAND
SEC.
2
(June
1,
2021),
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/21_0601_termination_of_mpp_pr
ogram.pdf [perma.cc/74SE-77FZ]; A-B- (Matter of A-B- III), 28 I. & N. Dec. 307 (A.G. 2021);
L-E-A- (Matter of L-E-A- III), 28 I. & N. Dec. 304 (A.G. 2021); A-C-A-A- (Matter of A-C-A-AII), 28 I. & N. Dec. 351 (A.G. 2021).
28. See CTR. FOR GENDER & REFUGEE STUD., supra note 4.
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be reunited with their parents.29 And the Remain in Mexico policy has
been forcibly reinstated by court order. 30
Yet, inaction is not the only problem at present. Deeply troubling
developments are flowing out of the Biden Administration as well. The
Biden Administration defied international and U.S. legal obligations
through its mass expulsion of Haitians along the border in the fall of
2021. 31 On August 20, 2021, regulations were proposed to streamline the
credible fear screening process that would also curtail a fulsome hearing
before an immigration judge.32 While the proposed regulations helpfully
provide for nonadversarial adjudication of applications for asylum,
withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against
Torture by asylum officers following positive credible fear screenings,
they also make review of errant negative decisions more difficult to
reverse.33 Despite a number of comments criticizing a deficiency of due
process in the proposal, the interim final rule published on March 29,
2022—while modifying the review procedures—continues to prioritize
rapid processing and tight deadlines to the exclusion of full and fair
adjudications.34 And perhaps most concerning, the administration not
only continued the use of harmful Title 42 public health expulsions at the
southern border, but it vigorously defended them even in the face of court
rulings that held the expulsions unlawful and pronouncements by public
health officials that they are unnecessary.35 Although the administration

29. Priscilla Alvarez, Parents of 391 Migrant Children Separated at Border Under Trump
Still Have Not Been Found, Court Filing Says, CNN (May 19, 2021, 5:45 PM),
https://www.cnn.com/2021/05/19/politics/ms-l-children-reunited/index.html
[perma.cc/Y3CA-56SQ].
30. Joseph Choi, Judge Orders Trump’s ‘Remain in Mexico’ Policy to Be Reinstated,
HILL (Aug. 15, 2021, 8:13 AM), https://thehill.com/policy/national-security/567918judge-orders-trumps-remain-in-mexico-policy-to-be-reinstated
[perma.cc/YYH9AVZF]; Flores & Aleaziz, supra note 12.
31. UNITED NATIONS, UN Rights Experts Condemn US Expulsion of Haitian Migrants
and
Refugees,
UN
NEWS
(Oct.
25,
2021),
https://news.un.org/en/story/2021/10/1103962 [perma.cc/RR66-9WWD].
32. Rebecca Beitsch, Biden Administration Seeks to Speed Review of Asylum Cases,
HILL (Aug. 18, 2021, 10:09 AM), https://thehill.com/policy/national-security/568351biden-administration-seeks-to-speed-review-of-asylum-cases [perma.cc/67J9-CCNH].
33. See Ted Hesson, U.S. Plans to Double Number of Asylum Officers in Biden Border
Overhaul,
REUTERS,
https://www.reuters.com/world/us/us-plans-double-numberasylum-officers-biden-border-overhaul-2021-08-18 [perma.cc/FB6Z-6TSN] (last updated
Aug. 18, 2021, 11:31 AM).
34. Procedures for Credible Fear Screening and Consideration of Asylum,
Withholding of Removal, and CAT Protection Claims by Asylum Officers, 87 Fed. Reg.
18,078 (Mar. 29, 2022) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pts. 208, 212, 235, 1003, 1208, 1235,
1240).
35. Claire Hansen, Biden Administration Digs in Heels on Controversial Title 42 Border
Order, U.S. NEWS (Aug. 3, 2021, 12:02 PM), https://www.usnews.com/news/nationalnews/articles/2021-08-03/biden-administration-digs-in-heels-on-controversial-title42-border-order [perma.cc/A6LN-K9PX]; Sarah Sherman-Stokes & Lindsay M. Harris,
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recently announced that the order calling for the expulsions will be
terminated as of May 23, 2022, 36 the order could be reinstated at any
time, and there is some risk that the termination could be enjoined, as it
has already been challenged by a group of states in federal court. 37 In
short, the U.S. asylum system remains in a state of crisis. And this crisis
coincides with the large influx of Afghan evacuees arriving in the U.S.,
thousands of whom must seek asylum.38
Significant continued efforts will be required just to reverse Trump
era changes and revert to the status quo ante. Yet, simply undoing the
damage wrought by the former administration is not enough, because
any advances made now can be just as easily reversed by a future neoTrumpian president. If the U.S. asylum system is to be securely
reconstructed, additional lasting reforms are required. To lay the
groundwork for exploring such durable solutions, we will proceed to
analyze how we got here.
II.

HOW DID WE REACH THIS POINT?

In the wake of the horrors of the Holocaust, the global community of
nations convened to create the 1950 U.N. Convention Relating to the
Status of Refugees (popularly known as the Refugee Convention). This
document, as amended by the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of
Refugees, continues to serve as the historical foundation of the
contemporary refugee framework globally and within the U.S.39
Despite Promises, Biden Looks a Lot Like Trump on Border Issues, BLOOMBERG L. (Oct. 20,
2021, 4:00 AM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/us-law-week/despite-promises-bidenlooks-a-lot-like-trump-on-border-issues [perma.cc/74TJ-AR58]; Letter to CDC Director
Walensky, HHS Secretary Becerra, and DHS Secretary Mayorkas on the August 2021 Title 42
Order,
COLUM.
PUB.
HEALTH
(Sept.
1,
2021),
https://www.publichealth.columbia.edu/sites/default/files/sept_1_2021_title_42
_letter.pdf [perma.cc/KEK2-UVKB] [hereinafter Letter to CDC Director]; Huisha-Huisha v.
Mayorkas, No. 21-5200, 2022 WL 628061, at *4 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 4, 2022) (holding that Title
42 expulsions without screening for relief under 8 U.S.C. § 1231 is contrary to law); Title
42 Termination with Respect to Unaccompanied Noncitizen Children, CDC (Mar. 12, 2022),
https://www.cdc.gov/media/releases/2022/s0311-title-42-termination.html
[perma.cc/FR7W-PEUZ] (exempting unaccompanied children but leaving intact existing
Title 42 orders for adult asylum seekers).
36. CDC Public Health Determination and Termination of Title 42 Order, CDC (Apr. 1,
2022), https://www.cdc.gov/media/releases/2022/s0401-title-42.html [perma.cc/SM28QR7L].
37. Rebecca Beitsch, Three GOP States Sue over End of Title 42, HILL (April 4, 2022,
11:47 AM), https://thehill.com/latino/3258301-three-gop-states-sue-over-end-of-title-42
[perma.cc/38CH-765D].
38. Michelle Hackman, Afghan Refugees in the U.S.: How They’re Vetted, Where They’re
Going, and How to Help, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 21, 2022, 7:26 AM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/afghan-refugees-in-the-u-s-how-theyre-vetted-wheretheyre-going-and-how-to-help-11630677004 [perma.cc/MV2R-43SB].
39. The United States acceded to Articles 2 through 34 of the Refugee Convention
when it signed on to the Protocol in 1968. See Immigr. & Naturalization Serv. v. Stevic, 467
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However, it was not until the passage of the 1980 Refugee Act that the
U.S. brought itself into full conformity with its international obligations
under the Refugee Convention and Protocol.
The Refugee Act defines a refugee as:
[A]ny person who is outside any country of such person’s nationality or,
in the case of a person having no nationality, is outside any country in
which such person last habitually resided, and who is unable or
unwilling to return to, and is unable or unwilling to avail himself or
herself of the protection of, that country because of persecution or a
well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion,
nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political
opinion.40

Legion are the opinions and decisions—issued by courts and the
administrative agency entrusted with the interpretation and application
of this statute—describing, defining, and refining the various facets to the
refugee definition. While Congress has passed numerous laws affecting
asylum eligibility and procedure (including statutory bars to filing and
relief, screening mechanisms for claims asserted at the border, relevant
burdens of proof, and guidance related to making credibility
determinations), it has left the core refugee definition largely untouched.
Instead, Congress has preferred to grant wide latitude to administrative
agencies to fill in gaps through the regulatory process, case-by-case
adjudication, and interagency policy guidance. And courts have fashioned
judicial doctrines of deference—dubbed Chevron deference when the
agency is construing an ambiguous statute, and Auer deference when it is
interpreting an ambiguous regulation—that provides additional latitude
to the agency to shape asylum policy.
This legislative flexibility has been both implied and explicit. In
addition to the regular functioning of administrative agencies by virtue
of the Administrative Procedures Act, Congress specifically provided that
asylum is a discretionary form of relief and that the Attorney General has
been granted the authority to establish by regulation “additional
limitations and conditions, consistent with [the statute], under which [a
noncitizen] shall be ineligible for asylum.”41
The Trump Administration unequivocally demonstrated that the
inherent and explicit discretionary powers Congress conferred upon the
executive could be easily weaponized and used, if not to defeat the
purpose of the Refugee Act, then at least to undermine it. Although many
of President Trump’s policy and regulatory proposals aimed at limiting

U.S. 407, 416 (1984); Immigr. & Naturalization Serv. v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 429
(1987).
40. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42).
41. Id. § 1158(b)(2)(c).
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procedural access to asylum were quickly enjoined by the courts, 42 some
of the more pernicious substantive changes to asylum eligibility, such as
those relating to the nonstate actor test, nexus, and social group law
received widespread deference from the courts of appeals.
For example, in the nonstate-actor context, the Trump
Administration, as noted above, attempted to heighten the standard for
demonstrating state involvement in persecution. Long before the passage
of the 1980 Refugee Act, U.S. adjudicators recognized that a refugee can
be one fleeing state-perpetrated persecution or nonstate persecution
from which the state is either “unable or unwilling” to provide effective
protection.43 In the decades that followed, the unable-or-unwilling test
was recognized and accepted by the immigration agency and every
federal court of appeals.44 But in 2018, Attorney General Jeff Sessions
wrote in Matter of A-B- I that to satisfy the nonstate-actor requirement,
an applicant must show that their government either “condone[s]” the
persecution or is “complete[ly] helpless[]” to protect them from such
persecution.45 Despite the linguistic difference between the words
“unwilling” and “condone” or the words “unable” and “completely
helpless,” Sessions did not acknowledge that he was heightening the
standard, let alone provide a rational explanation for the departure.
Sessions’s omission was even more striking given evidence showing that
asylum seekers are twice as likely to lose their case when the condoneor-complete-helplessness language is cited than when the unwilling-orunable test is used.46
Nevertheless, courts of appeals in the Second, 47 Third, 48 and Fifth49
Circuits have deferred to Session’s condone-or-complete-helplessness
formulation. While some courts of appeals have questioned the validity
of the condone-or-complete-helplessness test,50 only the Court of

42. See e.g., E. Bay Sanctuary Covenant v. Barr, 391 F. Supp. 3d 974 (N.D. Cal. 2019)
(enjoining the third country transit bar); Pangea Legal Servs. v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec.,
512 F. Supp. 3d 966 (N.D. Cal. 2019) (enjoining Procedures for Asylum and Withholding of
Removal; Credible Fear and Reasonable Fear Review, 85 Fed. Reg. 80,274 (Dec. 11, 2020)
(to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pts. 208, 235, 1003, 1208, and 1235), dubbed the “death to
asylum” rule, see infra note 83); E. Bay Sanctuary Covenant v. Trump, 354 F. Supp. 3d 1094
(N.D. Cal. 2018) (enjoining President Trump’s entry ban proclamation and rule for asylum
seekers at the southern border).
43. See, e.g., Rosa v. Immigr. & Naturalization Serv., 440 F.2d 100, 102 (1st Cir. 1971);
Tan, 12 I. & N. Dec. 564, 568 (B.I.A. 1967); Pierre, 15 I. & N. Dec. 461, 462 (B.I.A. 1975).
44. Ellison & Gupta, supra note 15, at 467–91.
45. Matter of A-B- I, 27 I. & N. Dec. 316, 337 (A.G. 2018).
46. Ellison & Gupta, supra note 15, at 485.
47. Scarlett v. Barr, 957 F.3d 316, 332–33 (2d Cir. 2020).
48. Galeas Figueroa v. Att’y Gen., 998 F.3d 77, 91 (3d Cir. 2021).
49. Gonzales-Veliz v. Barr, 938 F.3d 219, 232–34 (5th Cir. 2019).
50. See, e.g., Galloso v. Barr, 954 F.3d 1189, 1192 (8th Cir. 2020) (holding that
because the familiar unable-or-unwilling test came first, it must control); Rosales Justo v.
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Appeals for the D.C. Circuit has clearly held that the condone-orcomplete-helplessness articulation is a new and heightened standard,
inconsistent with the traditional test.51 Even then, the court held that the
agency failed to provide any explanation for the change; it did not
foreclose the possibility of the agency providing a reasonable explanation
to which the court would later defer.52
An equally salient example of the executive branch’s ability to
unilaterally undermine the purposes of the Refugee Act exists in the area
of social group law, where the vast majority of courts have afforded
deference to the agency’s three-part test for analyzing the cognizability
of a particular social group. 53 While the Board of Immigration Appeals
(BIA) had originally adopted a common sense approach to the statutory
term “particular social group,” it later sought to narrow eligibility by
further defining that term.
Initially, the BIA employed the canon of statutory construction
ejusdem generis (meaning of the same kind) to conclude that the
ambiguous term should be construed consistently with the other
protected characteristics listed in the refugee definition: race, religion,
nationality, and political opinion. 54 In a carefully reasoned decision in
1985, the BIA held that the common thread that united each of these
protected characteristics is that they all were grounded in an immutable
characteristic, that is, a characteristic that was so fundamental to one’s
identity that one either could not change it or should not be required to
change it.55 Thus, the very sensible immutability test was born for
evaluating social groups. A particular social group consisted of a group of
individuals who shared a common immutable characteristic.
Under this test, one would expect that family, gender and sexual
orientation, and shared past experiences that place one at risk of
persecution would pass muster. Indeed, a number of groups were readily

Sessions, 895 F.3d 154, 164 (1st Cir. 2018) (citing Matter of A-B- I but applying the familiar
unwilling-or-unable test); Juan Antonio v. Barr, 959 F.3d 778, 790 n.3, 795 (6th Cir. 2020)
(finding that Matter of A-B- I, including the condone-or-complete-helplessness standard,
had been abrogated).
51. Grace v. Barr, 965 F.3d 883, 898–900 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (concluding that Matter of
A-B- I adopted a “new, more demanding standard ‘without acknowledging or explaining
the change’ ”) (quoting Appellee’s Brief at 52, Grace v. Barr, 965 F.3d 883 (D.C. Cir. 2020)
(No. 19-5013)).
52. Id. at 900–03.
53. See, e.g., Granada-Rubio v. Lynch, 814 F.3d 35, 38 (1st Cir. 2016); Ordonez Azmen
v. Barr, 965 F.3d 128, 134 (2d Cir. 2020); S.E.R.L. v. Att’y Gen., 894 F.3d 535, 550–55 (3d
Cir. 2018); Nolasco v. Garland, 7 F. 4th 180, 187 (4th Cir. 2021); Gonzales-Veliz v. Barr, 938
F.3d 219, 230 (5th Cir. 2019); Zaldana Menijar v. Lynch, 812 F.3d 491, 498 (6th Cir. 2015);
Fuentes v. Barr, 969 F.3d 865, 871 (8th Cir. 2020); Villegas Sanchez v. Garland, 990 F.3d
1173, 1180 (9th Cir. 2021); Rodas-Orellana v. Holder, 780 F.3d 982, 992–93 (10th Cir.
2015); Alvarado v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 984 F.3d 982, 989 (11th Cir. 2020).
54. Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 233 (B.I.A. 1985).
55. Id.
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identified using this immutability test. In 1988, for example, former
police and military were recognized as possessing a shared past
experience that could constitute a cognizable social group. 56 In a 1990
decision, members of the LGBT community were acknowledged as
possessing an immutable characteristic.57 In 1996, clan membership and
women fearing female genital mutilation were likewise recognized as
valid social groups. 58
However, as alluded to above, the agency apparently began to harbor
concerns that this social group test—though entirely workable—opened
access to protection to just too many people. Thus, beginning in 2006
under the Bush Administration, the BIA began adding to the social group
analysis in an effort to narrow the pool of potential applicants.59 The BIA
announced that in addition to possessing an immutable characteristic, a
viable social group would now also need to possess social visibility.60 The
BIA claimed that this addition was consistent with its prior decisions, but
questions arose almost immediately regarding how some groups—such
as past former association and sexual orientation—were visible to the
extent that those characteristics were often hidden. 61
Such questions notwithstanding, the BIA continued down this path
by delineating a particularity requirement the following year. There, the
BIA held that a viable social group must be clearly defined and not
amorphous, subjective, inchoate, or diffuse.62 In applying this test, the
BIA reasoned that wealth status was simply too subjective and
amorphous to provide a measurable benchmark for group
membership,63 and thus the particularity prong was born.
The next year, in 2008, the BIA employed the newly minted social
visibility and particularity requirements to hold that Honduran youth
perceived to be affiliated with gangs and Salvadoran youth subjected to
gang recruitment efforts likewise failed under the two additional social
group prongs.64 In the years that followed, courts began to question the
addition of these two nascent social group requirements and to ask
whether the original collection of social groups recognized using the
immutability test would survive under the newly formulated rules. In
particular, courts reacted to some statements from the BIA suggesting
that groups had to be visible in the sense that one could discern group

56. Fuentes, 19 I. & N. Dec. 658 (B.I.A. 1988).
57. Toboso-Alfonso, 20 I. & N. Dec. 819 (B.I.A. 1990).
58. H-, 21 I. & N. Dec. 337 (B.I.A. 1996); Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. 357 (B.I.A. 1996).
59. See C-A-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 951 (B.I.A. 2006).
60. Id. at 959–61.
61. See, e.g., Gatimi v. Holder, 578 F.3d 611, 615 (7th Cir. 2009); ValdiviezoGaldamez v. Att’y Gen., 663 F.3d 582, 604 (3d Cir. 2011).
62. A-M-E-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 69, 76 (B.I.A. 2007).
63. Id.
64. E-A-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 591 (B.I.A. 2008); S-E-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 579 (B.I.A. 2008).
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membership simply by looking at a person. If this is what social visibility
meant, then the new requirement would unquestionably rule out most of
the groups recognized under the immutability test (for example, LGBTQ
individuals or women who had not yet undergone female genital cutting),
particularly given that refugees go to great lengths to hide the
characteristic that gives rise to their persecution.65 Moreover, returning
to the principle of ejusdem generis that first guided the BIA in articulating
the immutability test, it would seem that the statutorily recognized
characteristics of religion, nationality, and political opinion could
likewise fail under any requirement that one’s protected characteristic
be visible to the eye.
To address these criticisms, the BIA issued a pair of decisions in 2014,
clarifying that it was not requiring “ocular visibility,” but “social
distinction”; that is, the society in question should recognize the group as
being set apart in some way, distinct from other members of the country
of feared persecution.66 Since that time, almost every court of appeals in
the country has deferred to this refined three-part test, though it has
continued to garner scholarly criticisms that the formulation is not
workable and unfairly applied.67
Nevertheless, the three-prong social group test is as firmly
entrenched now as it has even been. And it continues to provide
significant flexibility to the executive branch to define the scope of
protection to social groups, both new and old. As mentioned above, the
Trump Administration used this flexibility to hold that previously
recognized gender-based and family-based groups were no longer
cognizable under the test. Consequently, at the end of the Trump
Administration, looking back to when the BIA first departed from the
immutability test in 2006, there was not a single precedent BIA decision
left standing recognizing a viable social group that satisfied the threepronged test. 68
Similarly, courts have taken a very deferential posture in relation to
the agency’s elaborations upon the nexus requirement, which mandates
applicants to prove that their persecution is “on account of” a statutorily

65. See, e.g., Gatimi, 578 F.3d at 615; Valdiviezo-Galdamez, 663 F.3d at 604.
66. W-G-R-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 208, 211–12 (B.I.A. 2014); M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227,
236 (B.I.A. 2014).
67. See Benjamin Casper, Katherine Evans, Julia DiBartolomeo Decker & Haley
Steptoe, Matter of M-E-V-G- and the BIA’s Confounding Legal Standard for “Membership in
a Particular Social Group,” IMMIGR. BRIEFINGS, June 2014, at 11–13, 19–22.
68. Following the creation of the three-prong test, A-R-C-G- and Matter of L-E-A- I
were the only two precedent decisions that had recognized examples of cognizable social
groups that could satisfy that test by the start of the Trump Administration. See supra notes
21–23 and accompanying text. Since both decisions were vacated during his presidency,
not a single example of a cognizable group recognized in a published BIA decision was left
by the time he left office.
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protected characteristic.69 Long before the Trump Administration, the
lack of statutory or regulatory guidance as to the proper formulation of
the nexus requirement resulted in unequal application of the nexus rule.
With respect to nonstate persecutor claims in particular, immigration
judges and the BIA often weighed more heavily nonprotected reasons for
the persecution, even when protected reasons were present. In domestic
violence claims, for example, the agency denied asylum despite ample
country conditions evidence showing that the majority of victims of
abuse are women, reasoning that the abuse occurred on account of the
abuser’s desire to control the victim or simply because the abuser is a
“despicable person,” rather than on account of the victim’s gender or
membership in a particular social group. 70 The agency made similarly
problematic nexus findings in other contexts, including in cases involving
forced sterilization, human trafficking, forced marriage, religion, gang
violence, sexual orientation, and membership in a family.71
While Congress amended the asylum statute in 2005 through
passage of the REAL ID Act, it largely codified what had already been
widely recognized by courts 72—namely, that a refugee need establish
that her protected characteristic was or would be at least one central
reason for her past or feared persecution. 73 The BIA would later interpret
this statutory language to signify that in mixed-motive asylum cases “the
protected ground cannot play a minor role[, and] . . . cannot be incidental,
tangential, superficial, or subordinate to another reason for harm.” 74
Courts mostly deferred to this interpretation as well. 75
Arguing that the REAL ID Act did little to solve the problems resulting
from the lack of standards in the nexus analysis, some legal scholars

69. See DEBORAH E. ANKER, LAW OF ASYLUM IN THE UNITED STATES § 5:8 (2021) (noting
widespread deference to the BIA’s nexus decision in S-P-, 21 I. & N. Dec. 486 (B.I.A. 1996)).
70. See R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 906, 927 (B.I.A. 1999) (“In sum, we find that the
respondent has been the victim of tragic and severe spouse abuse. We further find that her
husband’s motivation, to the extent it can be ascertained, has varied; some abuse occurred
because of his warped perception of and reaction to her behavior, while some likely arose
out of psychological disorder, pure meanness, or no apparent reason at all.”); Karen
Musalo & Stephen Knight, Gender-Based Asylum: An Analysis of Recent Trends, 77 No. 42
INTERPRETER RELEASES 1533, 1535 (2000) (stating that in D-K- (B.I.A. Jan. 20, 2000), the
immigration judge “denied asylum, ruling that Ms. Kuna had not been persecuted on
account of her membership in either group, or for any political reason, but solely because
her husband was ‘a despicable person’ ”).
71. Anjum Gupta, The New Nexus, 85 U. COLO. L. REV. 377, 389–422 (2014).
72. A notable exception, however, existed with respect to Ninth Circuit case law that
had held that the nexus requirement was satisfied where the persecutor was motivated at
least in part—rather than in central part—by a protected ground. H.R. REP. NO. 109-72, at
162–63 (2005).
73. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i).
74. J-B-N-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 208, 214 (B.I.A. 2007).
75. See ANKER, supra note 69, at § 5:12.
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argued that a simple “but-for” test would suffice in most claims.76 Again
leveraging this lack of statutory guidance and the judicial deference
afforded to the agency, the Trump Administration, through Acting
Attorney General Rosen, held that “[t]o establish the necessary nexus, the
protected ground: (1) must be a but-for cause of the wrongdoer’s act; and
(2) must play more than a minor role[, and] . . . cannot be incidental or
tangential to another reason for the act.” 77 Elaborating further, the
attorney general explained that where an individual is targeted as a
means to another end—for example, targeting a son in order to force a
father to comply with the persecutor’s demand—there is no nexus
because the persecutor has no particular animus against the family.78 So
though the “applicant’s status as a member of his father’s immediate
family may have been a but-for cause of the harm he suffered,” it was “not
a ‘central’ reason” according to Rosen. 79 Rosen’s application of his own
rule makes clear that the second part of the test, in effect, swallows the
first and makes the test more, not less, burdensome than it had been, even
after passage of the REAL ID Act. The Trump Administration used the
opportunity created by agency discretion to interpret and apply the law
to fashion a policy that would provide the least amount of protection
possible.
Finally, and perhaps most tellingly, just prior to leaving office, the
Trump Administration tried to implement a cadre of new discretionary
bars to asylum by invoking the statutory authority given to the attorney
general to establish by regulation “additional limitations and
conditions . . . under which [a noncitizen] shall be ineligible for asylum.”80
The regulation represented the most radical and breathtaking restriction
on the scope of asylum ever proposed.81 It designated three factors as
“significantly adverse.”82 Those factors barred asylum for individuals
who: (1) “unlawful[ly] ent[er]” or attempt to enter the United States, with
just a narrow exception for those fleeing from “a contiguous country;” (2)
fail to “seek asylum or refugee protection in at least one country” through
which they “transited before entering the” U.S.; and (3) use “fraudulent
documents to enter the United States, unless the [noncitizen]
arrived . . . by air, sea, or land directly from the applicant’s home country
76. See, e.g., STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY & CRISTINA M. RODRÍGUEZ, IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE
LAW AND POLICY 985–90 (5th ed. 2009); Anjum Gupta, The New Nexus, 85 U. COLO. L. REV.
377 (2014) [hereinafter Gupta, New Nexus]; Anjum Gupta, Nexus Redux, 90 IND. L.J. 465
(2015) [hereinafter Gupta, New Redux].
77. Matter of A-B- II, 28 I. & N. Dec. 199, 208, 212 (A.G. 2021) (emphasis added).
78. Id. at 209.
79. Id.
80. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2)(c).
81. Procedures for Asylum and Withholding of Removal; Credible Fear and
Reasonable Fear Review, 85 Fed. Reg. 80,274 (Dec. 11, 2020) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pts.
208, 235, 1003, 1208, and 1235).
82. Id. at 80, 282.
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without transiting through any other country.” 83 The rule also created
nine other “adverse factors” that all but guaranteed “the denial of asylum
as a matter of discretion.”84 Such factors included any individual who has:
(1) “spent more than 14 days in any one country that permitted
application for refugee, asylee, or similar protections prior to entering or
arriving in the United States”; (2) traveled through “more than one
country prior to arrival in the” U.S.; (3) incurred certain criminal
convictions that remain valid for immigration purposes; (4) accrued
“more than one year of unlawful presence” prior to filing an application
for asylum; (5) failed to file a required tax return; (6) “had two or more
prior asylum applications denied for any reason”; (7) “withdr[ew] an
asylum application with prejudice or . . . abandoned an asylum
application”; (8) missed an asylum interview; or (9) failed to “file a
motion to reopen within one year” of a change in circumstances.85 Only
where
such
applicants
could
establish
“extraordinary
circumstances . . . involving national security or foreign policy
considerations,” or demonstrate “by clear and convincing evidence, that
the denial . . . would result in an exceptional and extremely unusual
hardship” can they possibly overcome these new asylum bars.86
The rule appeared to be a calculated attempt to guarantee the denial
of as many claims as possible. Given the urgency surrounding the need to
flee persecution, many bona fide asylum seekers are unable to wait in
their country long enough to obtain a visa to enter the U.S. For those few
who have the resources and ability to seek a U.S. visa from a third
country, the requirement of nonimmigrant intent ensures that if an
applicant discloses her fear of persecution, and thus her intent to
abandon her foreign residence, she will not be granted a U.S. visa to enter.
If she obtains a visa by misrepresenting her true intentions to seek
asylum in the U.S. or by presenting fraudulent documents, she would
have faced denial under the new rule. If she remained for more than two
weeks in that third country while waiting for her visa decision, she would
have faced an additional ground of denial under the rule. If she accurately
represented her intentions during her visa interview—resulting in a
denial of her visa—and was thus forced to travel through other countries
to present herself at a U.S. port of entry, she would have added yet
another reason for denial under the rule. Once she arrived at the U.S.
border, because of arbitrarily created wait times and the Remain in
Mexico policy, she would have been denied entry. If, out of fear and
desperation, she sought to enter the U.S. outside of a port of entry to seek
asylum from within the U.S., she would have incurred yet another reason
for denial under the rule.

83.
84.
85.
86.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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This final regulation was aptly dubbed the “death to asylum”
regulation, and it represented the apotheosis of the Trump
Administration’s efforts to create “unsolvable dilemmas” for refugees
and asylum seekers.87 In fact, White House Senior Policy Adviser, Stephen
Miller, candidly admitted that stopping asylum seekers was “all [he]
care[d] about”88 and that he would have been “happy if not a single
refugee foot ever again touched America’s soil.” 89 While this “death to
asylum” regulation never went into effect—having been enjoined by a
federal court because Chad Wolf was not lawfully serving as Acting
Secretary of DHS at the time the rules were promulgated—the statutory
authority employed by the Trump Administration to create this rule (i.e.,
8 U.S.C. § 1158(5)(B)) remains on the books.
Each of the foregoing examples illustrates that the conditions that
made possible many of the changes implemented by the Trump
Administration long predated President Trump. The posture of extreme
deference permeating the U.S. asylum system emanates both from the
asylum statute itself and from long-standing principles of administrative
law. The significant degree to which courts have deferred to agency
constructions of the asylum statute and regulations are well-established
features of Chevron and Auer deference. Under the Chevron deference
doctrine, a court first determines whether Congress clearly expressed its
intent with regard to “the precise question at issue” by employing the
“traditional tools of statutory construction.”90 Where a statute is
ambiguous, however, the court is required to defer to any reasonable or
permissible agency interpretation, even where that interpretation is
contrary to a prior construction by that court. 91 This two-step approach
also applies to an agency’s interpretation of its own regulations (referred

87. Bill Frelick, The Trump Administration’s Final Insult and Injury to Refugees, HUM.
RTS. WATCH (Dec. 11, 2020, 6:00 AM), https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/12/11/trumpadministrations-final-insult-and-injury-refugees# [perma.cc/5QFE-BZT5].
88. Molly Olmstead, Stephen Miller: Stopping Asylum-Seekers Is “All I Care About,”
SLATE (Feb. 21, 2020, 1:21 PM, https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2020/02/stephenmiller-immigration-this-is-my-life.html [perma.cc/3MTV-L4EH].
89. See Ellen Cranley, Stephen Miller Said He ‘Would be Happy If Not a Single Refugee’
Came to the US, According to Ex Trump Aide, BUS. INSIDER (Jan. 28, 2019, 10:42 AM),
https://www.businessinsider.com/stephen-miller-said-he-would-be-happy-if-not-asingle-refugee-came-to-us-2019-1 [perma.cc/ZQ4C-948V]; see also Michael D. Shear &
Maggie Habberman, Trump’s Temporary Halt to Immigration Is Part of Broader Plan,
Stephen
Miller
Says,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Aug.
26,
2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/24/us/politics/coronavirus-trump-immigrationstephen-miller.html [perma.cc/Z34A-7QT6].
90. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842, 843 n.9
(1984).
91. Id.; United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 229, 237 (2001); Nat’l Cable &
Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 984 (2005).
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to as Auer deference).92 Taken together, these statutory and judicially
created doctrines of deference grant the executive branch near
hegemony in fashioning U.S. asylum policy.
III. WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE?
As noted above, the Biden Administration has begun the process of
rolling back Trump-era executive orders, vacating some past attorney
general opinions, issuing new policy guidelines, and embarking on the
first steps to promulgate new regulations, ostensibly to realign the U.S.
with its international treaty obligations.93 As laudable as the
administration’s promises are, we are still waiting to see how they will
be implemented. As measured by the administration’s foot-dragging on
new substantive asylum regulations, use of Title 42 expulsions, and its
mishandling of claims presented by Haitians at the southern border,
there are serious reasons to be concerned. However, even if positive
changes are on the horizon, none will be insulated from further revision
or deconstruction by some future administration that wishes to revert to
the cruel policies of the past. So where do we go from here?
We contend that Congress, the administration, and the courts must
take action to provide an enduring solution to this crisis, one that ensures
that future presidents cannot defy our international obligations under
the Refugee Convention and Protocol. We do not purport to offer a
comprehensive solution here, but we do endeavor to sketch out a broad
array of solutions that would markedly improve the status quo.
First, we concur with the excellent policy proposals that have been
advanced by scholars to improve the functioning and fairness of the
asylum system.94 Such reforms include repealing the attorney general’s
authority to create additional discretionary bars; ensuring that asylum,
like withholding of removal, is a mandatory form of protection; repealing
the provision of law relied upon by President Trump to create the Remain
in Mexico policy; granting increased independence to immigration courts
by making them Article I courts; and creating mechanisms for indigent
asylum seekers to be appointed counsel.95 Several of these changes were
proposed in the Refugee Protection Act of 2019, sponsored by Senator

92. Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997); Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2412
(2019).
93. See, e.g., Matter of A-B- II, 28 I. & N. Dec. 199 (A.G. 2021); Matter of L-E-A- III, 28
I. & N. Dec. 304 (A.G. 2021); Exec. Order No. 14010, 86 Fed. Reg. 8,267 (Feb. 2, 2021).
94. See e.g., SCHOENHOLTZ ET AL ., supra note 2, at 124–29; T. ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF ,
DONALD KERWIN, CTR. FOR MIGRATION STUD. & ZOLBERG INST. ON MIGRATION & M OBILITY,
IMPROVING THE U.S. IMMIGRATION SYSTEM IN THE FIRST YEAR OF THE BIDEN ADMINISTRATION
(2020),
https://cmsny.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/Improving-the-USImmigration-System_Proposals_FINAL.pdf [perma.cc/BTT5-MU26].
95. See sources cited supra note 94.
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Patrick Leahy and Representative Zoe Lofgren.96 However, the bill has yet
to pass.
Adding to that list of substantive and procedural remedies, we
advocate for an explicit legislative prohibition on prosecuting asylum
seekers who enter the U.S. without authorization, consistent with our
international treaty obligations under Article 31 of the Refugee
Convention. Article 31 provides that states “shall not impose penalties,
on account of [the] illegal entry or presence, on refugees who . . . enter or
are present . . . without authorization, provided they present themselves
without delay to the authorities and show good cause for their illegal entry
or presence.”97 Coupled with this added legislative protection, Congress
should include a provision barring the separation of parents and children
except where the best interest of the child requires it. Such changes
would protect against any future effort to adopt a policy such as “zerotolerance.”
Relatedly, Congress should clarify that public health-related
expulsions cannot be myopically pursued at the expense of our
international legal obligations to provide asylum to bona fide refugees
presenting themselves at U.S. borders. While managing present and
future public health crises is important, it is a false bifurcation that the
U.S. can only pursue one of these objectives at a time. Alongside testing,
social distancing, masking, vaccinations, and contact tracing, asylum and
refugee processing can coexist.98 There may be reasonable and necessary
processing delays at the border and in refugee camps that occur during a
pandemic, but Congress should foreclose the use of any public health
crises as a pretext to freeze our humanitarian obligations.
To strengthen the refugee resettlement system in the U.S., Congress
should increase funding afforded to domestic refugee resettlement
organizations, both to offset the dramatic cuts experienced during the
Trump era and to provide more sustainable funding levels to ensure
resettlement organizations are able to execute adroitly their mission of
welcoming refugees into the U.S. As these organizations are scrambling
to meet the needs of Afghan evacuees, more resources are needed,
particularly to assist with the process of seeking asylum. 99
Likewise, we contend that Congress should adopt the familiar but-for
causation test (without the second part of Attorney General Rosen’s test)
as a safe harbor provision that is sufficient to establish that the
persecution occurred “on account of” the applicant’s protected

96. S. 2936, 116th Cong. (2019); H.R. 5210, 116th Cong. (2019).
97. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees art. 31(1), July 28, 1951, 189
U.N.T.S. 137 (emphasis added).
98. Letter to CDC Director, supra note 35.
99. Marco Poggio, 83,000 Afghans Made It to the US. Now They Need Lawyers, LAW360
(Feb. 6, 2022, 8:02 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1462197/83-000-afghansmade-it-to-the-us-now-they-need-lawyers [perma.cc/3MCV-GZ99].
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characteristic. That is, where an applicant can show that but for the
protected characteristic, the persecution would not have occurred (or
would have been much less likely to occur), the nexus requirement will
have been met.100 In the domestic violence context, for example, the “butfor” approach would provide asylum applicants with a clear benchmark
for demonstrating nexus, as applicants would be able to show that but for
their membership in a particular social group (defined by gender and
other characteristics), the abuse would likely not have occurred. The butfor causation model recognizes that there may be many causes for abuse,
each of which is necessary for the abuse to occur, but the existence of
multiple necessary factors does not negate the fact that any one of those
factors is an actual cause of the abuse.101 In asylum law, such a model
would recognize that while the persecutor’s “despicable” or “criminal”
nature may have been one reason for the abuse, the applicant’s protected
status was not only another reason for the abuse, but was a necessary
reason. This approach, which shifts the focus from the intent of the
persecutor to the status of the applicant, would also more closely
conform to the BIA’s recognition that individuals should be protected
from persecution that occurs on account of characteristics they are
unable to change or should not be required to change.102 Further, such a
modification would put an end to the BIA’s flawed means-to-an-end
reasoning and realign U.S. law more closely with international
standards.103
In regard to substantive asylum eligibility, the nonstate actor test
should be clarified through notice-and-comment rulemaking, such that
requisite state protection is measured by whether the applicant has
suffered past persecution from a nonstate actor (and thus the state failed
to protect) or whether the applicant possesses a well-founded fear of
future harm that the state is either unable or unwilling to prevent. Once
an applicant establishes past persecution at the hands of a nonstate actor,
the state’s unwillingness or inability to protect should be presumed, and
the burden should shift to the Department of Homeland Security to show
that the state is, in fact, willing and able to stop the persecution. The

100. Gupta, New Nexus, supra note 76, at 383.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 390 n.45.
103. See Gupta, New Nexus, supra note 76; see also Gupta, Nexus Redux, supra note 76
(providing an alternative basis for proving nexus in the small number of cases where it
may not be possible to show but-for causation). This alternative burden-shifting
framework begins with a prima facie showing that the protected ground played a role in
bringing about the persecution, similar to the “contributing cause” standard proposed by
other scholars. See, e.g., Michelle Foster, Causation in Context: Interpreting the Nexus Clause
in the Refugee Convention, 23 MICH. J. INT’L L. 265 (2002); James C. Hathaway & Michelle
Foster, The Causal Connection (“Nexus”) to a Convention Ground, 15 INT’L J. REFUGEE L. 461
(2003).
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reformed state protection test should also clarify that there is no penalty
for refugees who reasonably elect not to seek state protection. 104
With respect to particular social group analysis, the new
“particularity” and “social distinction” requirements should be
eliminated by regulation.105 These additional social group requirements,
in the hands of xenophobic adjudicators, are too easily utilized to deny
asylum to those with legitimate fear of harm due to characteristics they
are powerless to change.106 Accordingly, the “immutability” test should
be restored as the correct and sufficient test for the cognizability of
particular social groups. Under the immutability test, groups based on
gender, for example, would be explicitly recognized as cognizable social
groups.
Finally, informed by the lessons learned from the Trump era—and
the antecedents that made that era possible—one core feature of any
lasting solution to shore up asylum protections must include curbing the
current degree of explicit and implicit deference afforded to the executive
branch to narrow access to asylum and refugee protection. Whatever
merits may exist for the Chevron and Auer deference doctrines in general,
recent experience has demonstrated that rather than unique agency
expertise in administering this area of law, animus can become the
driving force in adopting one interpretation over another. For this
reason, scholars have called for an explicit end to the practice of courts
granting Chevron and Auer deference to the immigration agency’s
decisions interpreting statutes and regulations, particularly as it relates
to asylum and withholding.107 These forms of protection are anchored in
our international treaty obligations, which constitute the supreme law of
the land, and represent an area of law where courts are best able to
handle questions of statutory interpretation. 108
The flexibility Congress granted to the executive branch was never
intended to be used to circumscribe access so significantly to asylum as
to constitute its functional demise. Congress intended for U.S. law to
embody the full protections encompassed within our international treaty

104. See Law Scholars Urge DOJ and DHS to Adopt Protective Regulations Related to
Nonstate Actor Persecution, AM. IMMIGR. LAWS. ASS’N (May 27, 2021),
https://www.aila.org/infonet/law-scholars-urge-doj-and-dhs-to-adopt-protective
[perma.cc/S8MX-EGSX]; Andrew Paul Janco, ‘Unwilling’: The One-Word Revolution in
Refugee Status, 23 CONTEMP. EUR. HIST. 429 (2014).
105. See Stephen Legomsky & Karen Musalo, Asylum and the Three Little Words That
Can Spell Life or Death (May 28, 2021), https://www.justsecurity.org/76671/asylum-andthe-three-little-words-that-can-spell-life-or-death. [perma.cc/W6D7-K8NK].
106. Id.
107. Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia & Christopher J. Walker, The Case Against Chevron
Deference in Immigration Adjudication, 70 DUKE L.J. 1197 (2021); Maureen A. Sweeney,
Enforcing/Protection: The Danger of Chevron in Refugee Act Cases, 71 ADMIN. L. REV. 127
(2019).
108. Sweeney, supra note 107.
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obligations as provided for in the Refugee Convention and Protocol.
Shortly after the passage of the Refugee Act, the Supreme Court examined
its legislative history and explained that Congress “believed that
apparent differences between the Protocol and existing statutory law
could be reconciled by the Attorney General . . . and did not require any
modification of statutory language.”109 The Court noted that “to the
extent that domestic law was more generous than the Protocol, the
Attorney General would not alter existing practice.” 110 Of critical
importance here, the Court explained that “to the extent that the Protocol
was more generous than the bare text of [the statute,] . . . the Attorney
General would honor the requirements of the Protocol and hence there
was no need for modifying the language of [the statute] itself.”111 In other
words, the liberty Congress granted to the executive to administer the
asylum system was intended to be used to remain faithful to our core
obligations under international law and to maximize protection, not
diminish them.
Should courts continue to afford some deference to the immigration
agency’s asylum and refugee decisions, courts must recognize that
deference is not absolute. Noting the “[r]epeated egregious failures of the
Immigration Court and the Board to exercise care commensurate with
the stakes in an asylum case,” even before the Trump Administration,
some judges have observed that “[d]eference is earned; it is not a
birthright.”112 The aim of the Refugee Act was to codify the U.S.’s
obligations to provide safety to bona fide refugees. Thus, we contend that
courts should view the immigration agency’s adjudicatory
interpretations (whether of statutes or regulations) that have the effect
of restricting asylum with some skepticism and, at an absolute minimum,
strictly adhere to the Supreme Court’s instructions cabining deference.113
CONCLUSION
Though not a panacea, the legislative, regulatory, and judicial shifts
in the administration of asylum and refugee law for which we advocate
here would go a long way in preventing the sort of norm-defying abuses
109. Immigr. & Naturalization Servs. v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407, 417–18 (1984).
110. Id. at 429 n.22.
111. Id.
112. Kadia v. Gonzalez, 501 F.3d 817, 821, 823 (7th Cir. 2007) (“Deference is accorded
to the factfindings of government agencies because they know more about the activities
they regulate than the courts do.”).
113. Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2415-18 (2019). The Supreme Court has
explained that deference to an agency’s interpretation should only be given after a
determination that the regulation is “genuinely ambiguous,” that “the character and
context of the agency interpretation entitles it to controlling weight,” that the agency’s
interpretation “in some way implicate[s] its substantive expertise,” and that its “reading of
a rule . . . reflect[s] its ‘fair and considered judgment.’ ” Id. at 2406 (quoting Auer v. Robbins,
519 U.S. 452, 462 (1997)).
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witnessed during the Trump era. At the heart of what made those abuses
possible is an excess of discretionary authority to restrict access to
asylum. Such legally sanctioned discretion casts a penumbra of judicial
obsequiousness. And within that shadow, as recent history has shown, an
administration can take license to pursue an agenda that defies the
humanitarian ethos undergirding our refugee and asylum systems. In an
executive authority that lacks even a modicum of commitment to
international human rights, the U.S. asylum system can cease to function.
While the Biden Administration may eventually make good on its
promise to strengthen and restore the U.S. asylum system—and we
sincerely hope it does—those changes would last only as long as the
tenure of its ideological proponent. As such, a paradigm shift is needed. If
we are to take down the administrative wall of ineligibility and durably
reconstruct a more just, fair, and welcoming system for asylum seekers,
let us do so on a firmer foundation. Our refugee and asylum systems
should be grounded upon the normative judgment that refugees deserve
protection, and that core obligation must not be subject to degradation in
the name of deference.

